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ABSTRACT
This article examines the role of the shadow banking system in the global
financial crisis of 2007–9. In order to do this, one must first explain the
reasons for the explosive growth of shadow banking in the immediate pre-
crisis era. Current explanations for this growth tend to hold two
contrasting positions: one emphasising factors endogenous to the banking
sector (notably regulatory arbitrage and financial innovation); the other
emphasising exogenous factors (notably the ‘search for yield’). Integrating
these two explanations, in this article we develop a disaggregated view of
the shadow banking system. After clarifying the nature of the relation
between the regulated and shadow banking systems, we inquire more
closely into the different entities that inhabit the shadow banking system,
the different activities that these entities performed and the different
financial products that these entities supplied. The disaggregated view of
shadow banking suggests that while some parts of the system played an
important role in the initial subprime phase of the crisis through their
involvement with the toxic securities that were at its centre, other parts of
the system were key to the subsequent money and inter-bank phases of the
crisis through their close ties with the regulated banks.
KEYWORDS
shadow banking; securitization; financial crisis; financial regulation.
1. INTRODUCTION
The shadow banking system, broadly defined as a complex credit inter-
mediation network operating outside of the regulated banking sector,
has existed for decades. Yet it was only with the outbreak of the financial
crisis in the summer of 2007 that it became the subject of serious discus-
sion. Central to this debate has been the question as to why the shadow
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banking system expanded so rapidly in the run up to the meltdown of
2007–9. From the early 1950s right through to the late 1990s, the system
grew at a rate low enough to keep its size on average just below that of
the regulated banking system. Had the shadow banking system contin-
ued to grow at the same comparatively low rate at the start of the new
millennium, the financial crisis may not have occurred, or, at the very
least, it may not have assumed the seismic proportions that it did. The
fact of the matter, however, is that from about 2000 to mid-2007 the
shadow banking system expanded with such phenomenal speed that by
the summer of 2007 its size dwarfed that of the regular banking system.
In other words, the shadow banking system had, in a short span of time,
expanded to such proportions as to ensure that the problems surfacing
within it during 2007 were sufficient to bring the whole global financial
system to the brink of collapse.
Explanations for the pre-crisis shadow banking growth have tended to
hold two contrasting positions. The first and more popular position is to
emphasise factors that are endogenous to the banking sector as a whole,
chief amongst these being regulatory arbitrage and financial innovation
(e.g. Gorton, 2010; Gorton and Metrick, 2010; McCulley, 2009; Schwarcz,
2012). On the one hand, given the costs arising out of the regulatory con-
straints on their on-balance sheet activities, the large commercial banks
found it advantageous to shift increasing amounts of these activities off
their balance sheets in order to conserve capital and boost profits. On the
other hand, the virtual absence of any systematic regulation of their off-
balance sheet vehicles placed the commercial banks in an excellent posi-
tion to exploit advances in financial technology to the full. The second
position is to emphasise factors exogenous to the banking sector, chief
amongst these being the ‘search for yield’ on the part of hedge funds,
pension and mutual funds and other institutional investors (e.g.
Blankfein, 2009; Caballero, 2010; Goda et al., 2013; Goda and Lysandrou,
2014; Lysandrou, 2009; Lysandrou, 2012). The central argument here is
that given the unusually low yields in the traditional bond
markets in the immediate pre-2007 period, the shadow banking system
came under intense external pressure to supply additional quantities of
yield-bearing securities needed by investors.
Although both explanations have their strengths, they also have their
weaknesses. That of the ‘endogenous’ theory of shadow banking con-
cerns the time frame: financial deregulation and the financial innovation
process had been evolving globally long before 2000, so why was it only
from this point that the shadow banking system suddenly exploded in
size? The ‘exogenous’ version is on stronger ground here. However, its
major weakness concerns the relation between the regulated and unregu-
lated parts of the banking sector. If the latter was rapidly expanded from
the early 2000s in order to supply increasing volumes of securities to
2
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non-shadow bank institutions, why then was it the regulated banking
sector that suffered far more damage than any other part of the financial
system in the course of the financial crisis that ensued? It is the
‘endogenous’ theory of the origins of shadow banking that appears to
have the stronger answer to this question.
The upshot of the above observations is that any truly compelling
account of the explosive growth of the shadow banking system in the
immediate pre-crisis period has to be one that integrates the
‘endogenous’ and ‘exogenous’ versions of the growth story. This article
attempts this task by developing a disaggregated view of the shadow
banking system. After clarifying the nature of the relation between the
regulated and shadow banking systems, we examine more closely the
different entities that comprised the shadow banking system, the differ-
ent activities that these entities performed and the different financial
products that these entities supplied. Such a disaggregated view of the
shadow banking system as it operated at the time of the financial crisis
suggests that while some parts of shadow banking played an important
role in the initial subprime phase of the crisis through their involvement
with the toxic securities that were at its centre, other parts of the system
were central in the subsequent money and inter-bank phases of the crisis
through their close ties with the regulated banks.
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the relation
between the regulated and shadow banking systems on the eve of the cri-
sis. Section 3 discusses the role of the special purpose entities (SPEs) and
special investment vehicles (SIVs) in the crisis. Section 4 discusses the
role of the conduits in the crisis. Section 5 briefly discusses policy impli-
cations. Section 6 gives some conclusions.
2. THE SHADOW BANKING SYSTEM ON THE
EVE OF THE CRISIS
The shadow banking system had been growing for some time prior to the
outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007 (e.g. Rajan, 2005), but it was only at
this critical juncture that it began to command serious attention and even
acquire a name. It was Paul McCulley, then of PIMCO, who in his 2007
speech at the Federal Reserve Conference introduced the term ‘shadow
banking’, to describe ‘the whole alphabet soup of levered up non-bank
investment conduits, vehicles and structures’ (McCulley, 2007). Despite
its pejorative connotations, the term has been widely endorsed because it
neatly captures the principle of inverse parallelism: the fact that certain
activities conducted by the shadow banking sector in the pre-2007 period
were both similar to those conducted by the regular banking sector and
at the same time distinct in that they fell outside the scope of regulatory
supervision. When first introducing its discussion of the shadow banking
3
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system, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) was content to respect this
principle. To quote its opening definition: shadow banking is a ‘system
of credit intermediation that involves entities and activities outside the
regular banking system’ (FSB, 2012a: 1). The US Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission’s report of 2010 also emphasised this inverse parallelism
when it referred to the shadow banking’s ‘bank-like financial activities
that are conducted outside the traditional commercial banking system,
many of which are unregulated or lightly regulated’ (FCIC, 2010: 1).
As not all entities and activities outside of the regular banking system
pose the same level of risk, the FSB went on to give a second, narrower
definition of shadow banking that includes only those areas of it that do
pose a potentially substantial systemic risk. To quote: ‘the portion of the
shadow banking system that merits increased attention from authorities
can be defined as “a system of credit intermediation that involves entities
and activities outside the regular banking system and raises i) systemic
risk concerns, in particular by maturity/liquidity transformation, lever-
age and flawed credit risk transfer, and/or ii) regulatory arbitrage con-
cerns”‘ (FSB, 2012b: 2).1 This second definition, while possibly useful for
policy purposes is, in our view, unsatisfactory for the simple reason that
its central preoccupation is with the systemic effect of shadow banking
activities whereas it should be with their specific function. When one
defines a ‘car’ as a vehicle for transportation, one does not usually
include in that definition the possibility that if a car is driven too fast or
too carelessly it can cause death. Similarly, with shadow banking: the sys-
tem may indeed, as has turned out to be the case, pose huge systemic
risks by virtue of its unregulated and non-transparent nature, but its defi-
nition should nevertheless home in on its functionality. In other words,
the study of the phenomenon of shadow banking, and hence its concep-
tualisation, should focus on the reasons behind the expansion of the sys-
tem to the point where it could cause serious systemic damage. To this
end we propose as an alternative definition of the shadow banking sys-
tem the following: ‘the shadow banking system is a system of unregu-
lated off-bank balance sheet credit intermediation and maturity and
liquidity transformation activities conducted by bank owned or spon-
sored entities in the capital and money market domains for the primary
purpose of expanding the rate of production of yield bearing debt securi-
ties required by the global investor community.’
Our definition of the shadow banking system differs from that of the
FSB’s in several important respects, which are illustrated in Figure 1. The
first difference centres on the distinction between on- and off-bank bal-
ance sheet activities. There are instances, contemporary China is a case in
point, where certain banks can engage in on-balance sheet credit interme-
diation activities that fall outside of the scope of official regulation and
can therefore be classified as ‘shadow’ banks. However, as this type of
4
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shadow banking was not central to the financial crisis that unfolded in
the US and EU we shall exclude it from the current discussion and
reserve the term shadow banking to refer exclusively to the unregulated
off-balance-sheet entities and activities that are presented in the bottom
half of Table 1.
The second difference with the FSB’s definition concerns the relation-
ship between the banking sector on one hand, and the capital and money
market sectors on the other. In the regulated banking sphere, the credit
intermediation and attendant maturity and liquidity transformation
functions are usually performed by banks without recourse to any inter-
mediary role on the part of the capital and money markets. There is, of
course, a close association between these sectors, as shown in the top half
of Figure 1: on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets the capital and
money markets represent important sources of securities needed by the
banks, while on the liability side of banks’ balance sheets these same mar-
kets represent important sources of demand for securities issued by the
banks. However, the close association between the banking and capital
markets sectors is not in this case one that erases the distinction between
Table 1 Outline of the commercial bank-shadow bank nexus at the time of the
sub-prime crisis.
5
LYSANDROU AND NESVETAILOVA: SHADOW BANKING ENTITIES
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
ibr
ary
 Se
rv
ice
s C
ity
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
on
do
n]
 at
 13
:52
 01
 A
pr
il 2
01
4 
these sectors and the different types of activities taking place within
them. By contrast, this is the case in the shadow banking realm where the
capital and money markets are indispensable to the credit intermediation
and maturity/liquidity transformation functions performed by the spe-
cial purpose entities (SPEs), structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and
conduits. As shown in the bottom half of Figure 1, these three major types
of off-balance-sheet vehicles operating at the time of the subprime crisis
constituted the central medium through which the basic banking activi-
ties of taking deposits and extending loans on one side of the equation
were indissolubly mixed with the basic capital and money activities of
buying and selling securities on the other.
The third difference between our definition of the shadow banking sys-
tem and that of the FSB’s concerns the ‘stock-flow’ distinction. Schwarz
(2011-2: 621) argues that while official definitions of shadow banking
only include entities and activities, a proper definition should also cap-
ture the ‘essential element of shadow banking’, which ‘is that non-banks
provide financial products and services.’ What Schwarz is in effect saying
is that activities performed by shadow bank entities should be viewed
not only from a flow perspective, one where the focus is on activities as
financial transformation processes, but also from a stock perspective, one
where the focus is on the ‘products’ that result from those transformation
processes. The flow perspective on the shadow banking system is symp-
tomatic not only of the official definitions of the system but also of many
academic definitions. A classic case in point is Mehrling’s (2012) descrip-
tion of shadow banking as ‘money market funding of capital market
lending’, a description that neatly captures the flow dimension of the
relationship between money and capital market activities, but leaves out
their stock dimension, the fact that these activities result in securities, tan-
gible financial products.
While other academics do bring in this stock dimension, they tend to
do so in a way that subsumes it under the flow dimension. Pozsar and
Singh (2011), for example, specify three key functions undertaken by
shadow banks: reverse maturity transformation (where conventional
banks convert short-term deposits into long-term loans shadow banks do
the opposite, convert risky and opaque long-term assets into money-like,
short-term liabilities); collateral mining (obtaining collateral involves
both exploration, looking for deposits of collateral, and extraction, the
‘unearthing’ of passive securities so that they can be re-used as collateral
for various other purposes in the shadow banking system); liquidity
transformation (in a securitised lending structure, liquidity is created on
the balance sheet of a separate institution that, through techniques of
diversification and aggregation, ‘arbitrages’ higher-risk lower-liquid
assets into lower-risk higher-liquid assets). In each of these characterisa-
tions of the functions performed by shadow banks their stock dimension
6
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is alluded to through references to ‘assets’, ‘securities’, etc, but, as we say,
this dimension is not sufficiently demarcated from the flow dimension.
By contrast, our definition of the shadow banking system respects the
flow and stock dimensions of its activities in a way that not only main-
tains a clear distinction between them but also accords them co-primacy:
if the various financial transformation activities performed by the
shadow bank entities represent the flow side of their functions, the
creation of yield-bearing securities whose usefulness to buyers is to serve
as stores of value represent the equally important stock side of their func-
tions. The securities supplied by the shadow banking system right up to
the outbreak of the crisis essentially fell into two categories: short term
and long term. The predominant type of short-term security was asset-
backed commercial paper (ABCP). From a flow perspective, ABCP
merely represents a form of short-term funding of the long-term assets
held by the conduits and SIVs. Yet from a stock perspective it represents
an important type of value container demanded by short term investors
and most notably by the money market funds (MMFs). The predominant
types of long term securities were asset-backed securities (ABS) and
CDOs. Once again, while these credit instruments in one sense merely
represent forms of capital market lending funded by money market
borrowing, they also represent important supplements to the world’s
stocks of investable securities demanded by long-term investors such as
insurance companies and pension and mutual funds.
Defining the shadow banking system in a way that brings out the func-
tional stock-flow distinction has an important bearing on how to evaluate
the system’s role in the financial crisis, because the distinction helps to
delimit the boundaries that separate those entities operating at the core
of the system from those operating at its periphery. This demarcation
between core and periphery is either absent or blurred in most other defi-
nitions of shadow banking because in prioritising the flow dimension of
activities in the system just about every linkage between every entity per-
forming any type of credit intermediation and maturity/liquidity trans-
formation role is placed on an equal par. Indeed, this is why illustrations
of the system (see, for example, Pozsar et al., 2010) often end up present-
ing it as something resembling a computer circuit board or a Byzantine
network of cells and channels. The problem that then results from this
holistic view of the system is that it becomes difficult to identify the par-
ticular part played by particular entities at particular points in the finan-
cial crisis that unfolded over 2007–9. On the contrary, this task becomes
easier when the shadow bank system is examined from a disaggregated
perspective that ascribes as much importance to the stock dimension of
activities as to the flow dimension because it then becomes possible to
single out the SPEs, SIVs conduits as the core of the system. As these
were the only entities actually supplying the credit-backed securities that
7
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were at the centre of the crisis, we can track each entity’s involvement in
the crisis by focusing on the particular securities it created. In elaborating
on this argument, we begin by looking at the role of the SPEs and the
SIVs.
3. THE ROLE OF THE SPES AND SIVS IN THE CRISIS
The gross liabilities of a country’s shadow banking system are usually
taken as a measure of its size. In this frame, Figure 1 shows that the rate
of expansion of the US shadow banking system, while largely flat from
the early 1950s and moderately steady from the early 1980s to the early
2000s, suddenly exploded between that period and the outbreak of the
financial crisis. What has captured the attention of most commentators is
the fact that in this immediate pre-crisis period the size of the US shadow
banking system began to dominate that of the regular US banking system
(e.g. Pozsar et al., 2012). This comparison is common in the conventional
analyses of the financing function of the banking sector: if the main pre-
occupation is with the flow dimension of its credit intermediation and
maturity/liquidity transformation activities, then it makes sense to com-
pare the volume of these activities performed by the shadow banks with
the volume performed by their regular counterparts. If, however, the
angle of analysis also focuses on the stock dimension of these activities,
that is, on the ‘products’ resulting from them, then the more relevant
comparison is between developments in the US shadow banking system
on the one hand and developments in the US bond markets on the other.
As can be seen by comparing Figure 1 with Figure 2, there was a close
Figure 1 The growth of the US shadow banking system. Source: Pozsar et al.
(2012).
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correlation between the growth of US shadow banking between 2002 and
2007 and the unusually low yields in the major US bond markets that per-
sisted over this same period. This correlation was no mere coincidence
but a direct reflection of the growing demands made upon the US
shadow banking sector to help resolve the increasingly pressing yield
problem.
The source of the yield problem can be traced back to the relationship
between the world’s supply of government and corporate debt securities
and the world’s demand for these securities. That relationship remained
broadly balanced up to the early 2000s, but then became unbalanced as
global demand began to outstrip global supply. Traditionally, the major
sources of demand for US debt securities are the large institutional
investors of the US and other advanced market economies, most notably
insurance companies and pension funds. However, as shown in Figure 3,
in the decade prior to the crisis foreign sources of demand became
increasingly important, most notably those from governments, institu-
tional asset managers and high net worth individuals (HNWIs) based in
the emerging market economies (EMEs). Despite the pre-crisis era
changes in the geographical composition of world demand for securities,
there was no corresponding change in the geographical composition of
world bond supplies as attested by the fact that at end-2006 over 80% of
the world’s bond stocks of approximately $67 trillion were accounted for
by the G7 countries while the EMEs at the other end of the spectrum
accounted for a mere 9%, a figure that contrasts sharply with the EME’s
34% share of world GDP at that same time (see Lysandrou, 2013). Given
the lack of investable bonds in the EMEs and given the dominant position
Figure 2 US bond yields 1990–2007. Source: Goda et al. (2013)
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of the US bond markets (accounting for 46% of global stocks in 2006) it
was inevitable that the pressure of global demand for bonds would be
concentrated in these latter markets thereby helping to force the US trea-
sury yield and other US long term yields down to unusually low levels.
To quote Caballero (2010: 3), ‘[t]he entire world, including foreign central
banks and investors, but also many US financial institutions, had an insa-
tiable demand for safe debt instruments which put enormous pressure
Figure 3 Foreign holdings of US debt securities. Source: Goda et al. (2013)
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on the US financial system and its incentives.’ Bernanke et al. (2011) and
Goda et al. (2013) make similar arguments.
The first way in which the US shadow banking sector was pressed into
helping resolve the yield problem was by getting it to rapidly increase its
rate of production of asset-backed securities, the SPEs being the core
shadow banking entity charged with this task. As shown in Figure 4, the
SPEs used a variety of short-term funding instruments to finance pur-
chases of long term mortgage and other credit loans that would then be
securitised, with the resulting ABS marketed both outside of the banking
sector to a variety of institutional investors and inside the sector, namely
to the SIVs and conduits, more on which below. The non-bank institu-
tional demand for ABS played a largely accommodating role in the origi-
nal development of the US ABS market dating from the 1970s. Rather,
this early development was chiefly driven by supply push factors as gov-
ernment sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac –
and later on private commercial banks – resorted to securitisation as a
means of increasing residential mortgage lending while at the same time
conserving capital. However, by the 2000s, demand-pull pressure from
non-bank financial institutions took over as the main driving force
behind US ABS expansion, as is strongly indicated by the time scale of
events. Of the US shadow banking system’s $22 trillion gross liabilities in
2007, over $9 trillion consisted of asset-backed securities, a sum that rep-
resented over 80% of the world’s total ABS stocks of $11 trillion outstand-
ing at that time. However, an even more striking statistic is that
approximately $5.4 trillion of the US ABS figure for 2007 had been cre-
ated after 2002 (IMF, 2008). The US ABS market had been in existence for
Figure 4 Core shadow banking entities: SPEs.
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over four decades and yet well over half of its ABS stocks by the time of
the crisis in 2007 had been created in the preceding four years, in other
words, in precisely the same period when low treasury and corporate
bond yields remained an acute problem for investors.
While the rapid increase in the supplies of ABS in the US may have
gone some way towards alleviating the yield problem, it certainly did
not go all the way as evidenced by the fact that, despite the supply
increases, ABS yields also continued to remain unusually low right up to
2007. This observation brings us to the second way in which the US
shadow banking system was pressed into helping resolve the yield prob-
lem. Given the continuing shortfall in the supplies of US ‘first floor’
asset-backed securities relative to global demand, the system had to
make up for the shortfall by expanding the rate of production of CDOs,
‘second floor’ securities, securities backed by securities backed by loans.
The core shadow banking entities charged with this function were the
SIVs. As shown in Figure 5, these vehicles also used a variety of short-
term lending instruments to finance purchases of mortgage and other
credit-backed securities from the SPEs, these securities then being com-
bined together as backing collateral for CDOs, the bulk of which com-
prised AAA-rated tranches. SIVs created high-grade securities out of
lower grade ones through the use of three major credit enhancement
techniques (CETs): over-collateralisation (the volume of backing assets
held is greater than the volume of securities issued), subordination (inter-
est payments on super senior and senior securities are made first and
only then are holders of the mezzanine tranche securities paid and so on
Figure 5 Core shadow banking entities: SIVs.
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in descending order) and insurance (the senior tranches were given
insurance cover by a sponsoring bank, an insurance company or mono-
line insurer). The market for CDOs, as also shown in Figure 6, comprised
both non-bank financial institutions, primarily hedge funds but also con-
ventional institutional asset management firms, and other shadow bank
institutions, notably the conduits.
Despite the increase in the rate of CDO production after 2002, this rate
was still not high enough to satisfy investor demand. Thus it was that,
from this point on, as can be seen in Figure 6, synthetic and index tranche
CDOs (artificial CDOs constructed by using cash CDOs as reference enti-
ties for credit default swaps) began to replace cash CDOs as the predomi-
nant type. As one commentator observed at the time: ‘[t]he increase in
synthetic securitisations in the US can be attributed to several factors.
Among them are the enormous popularity of cash CDOs among hedge
fund investors and the ensuing shortage of hard asset collateral’ (Clark,
2008: 31). Where cash CDOs could take several months to create, syn-
thetic CDOs could be established in a matter of days and where cash
CDOs require the involvement of regular and shadow bank institutions
at every stage of their creation, synthetic and index tranche CDOs make
no such requirement. A measure of the increasing extent to which non-
bank institutional investors were creating artificial CDOs on their own
initiative is given by the changes in the participation ratios in the market
for credit derivatives between 2004 and 2006: while the percentage share
of banks fell from an average of 63% to an average of 48% over this
period, the percentage share of non-bank institutions rose by the opposite
amounts with the key driving force in this respect being the hedge funds,
Figure 6 CDO issuance. Source: Borio (2008).
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which became second to the banks as buyers and sellers of protection
(IMF, 2008).
The conclusion that follows from the above arguments is that the
‘exogenous’ explanations of the growth of the shadow banking system to
the point where it could cause enormous damage to the rest of the global
financial system have a great deal of plausibility. Had the US ABS and
CDO markets remained as small in 2007 as they had been just five years
earlier in 2002, the emergence of problems in those markets may not have
had any significant spill-over effect in the other financial markets. How-
ever, this is conjecture. The fact of the matter is that by 2007 these markets
had grown to a large enough size as to be able to wreak general havoc
when they experienced problems, and the principal driving forces behind
that market growth were the institutional investors searching for yield.
The external pressure on the shadow banks to create extra stocks of yield-
bearing securities was high. Not only were the institutional investors by
far the largest holders of ABS in 2007 (see, for example, Goda et al., 2013)
but also the largest holders of the $3 trillion worth of CDOs outstanding at
that time, with approximately 75% as compared with the 25% held by the
shadow banking sector, as can be seen in Table 2.
While confirming the validity of the ‘exogenous’ explanation of
shadow banking growth and its consequences, the last of the above
observations also raises a set of important questions. If the shadow bank-
ing sector had indeed succeeded in distributing the majority of the toxic
CDOs that it had created to institutions outside of the sector, with the lat-
ter itself remaining only a minority holder by the time of the subprime
crisis, why did it suffer such enormous damage on the outbreak of that
crisis? Furthermore, why did this damage extend to the regular banking
sector such as to bring it to the brink of collapse? To answer these
Table 2 Holders of CDOs: 2006.
Source: Blundell-Wignall (2007)
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questions we need to inquire into the third of the entities that constituted
the core of the shadow banking system, namely, the conduits.
4. THE ROLE OF THE CONDUITS IN THE CRISIS
In common with the other shadow bank entities, the liquidity and matu-
rity transformation activities of the conduits resulted in securities that
were sold to a wide variety of investors, in this case short-term securities,
ABCP, the principal source of demand for which came from the money
market mutual funds (MMFs). That said, the one important difference
separating the conduits from the other two entities is that they did not
typically engage in securitisation (neither the straightforward securitisa-
tion of loans as did the SPEs nor the re-securitisation of securities as did
the SIVs). Rather, their primary function, as shown in Figure 7, was sim-
ply to maximise the profits to be made from exploiting the difference in
the interests received on the assortment of long-term assets that they
held and the interests that they paid on their short-term liabilities.
The functional differences between the conduits and the SIVs are
clearly brought out in Table 3, which reproduces the IMF’s own sum-
mary of the distinguishing features of these entities. Note that while the
SIVs were officially classified as entities whose ‘assets are traded’, the
conduits were classified as entities whose assets largely consisted of
‘nontradable loans’. Note also the significant difference in the size of
assets held respectively by these two types of entities on the eve of the
crisis: SIVs held a much lower amount of assets ($400 billion) compared
with the amount ($1.4 trillion) held by the conduits, a difference in keep-
ing with the fact that while the SIVs’ chief source of profits was the fees
Figure 7 Core shadow banking entities: conduits.
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earned from the sales of CDOs, the conduits’ chief source of profits came
from the difference between the returns on their asset holdings and the
interest payments on their commercial paper.
While the conduits differed from the SIVs in terms of asset size at the
time of the subprime crisis, there was no basic difference as concerns the
percentage share of CDOs in the total assets held. Table 3 shows that at
end of 2006 just 22% of the SIVs’ assets were comprised of CDOs, a ratio
not far off the 25% aggregate share of all CDOs held by the shadow bank-
ing system as a whole at that time. That this pattern pertained as much to
the conduits as to the other shadow bank entities becomes clear from
Table 4 that profiles the asset holdings of the ten largest conduits operat-
ing at the end of 2006. Only in two of the ten cases were CDOs the pre-
dominant asset class held; in the other eight cases other asset classes
predominated. If this same situation was replicated throughout the entire
300 strong conduit community, as can be reasonably assumed, then it
would seem that when the CDO market crashed in August 2007, the
lending institutions in the wholesale money markets should have been
more discriminating in deciding which particular borrowing institutions
should be denied continued access to short-term funds. This did not hap-
pen. Rather, the panic amongst lenders sparked by the BNP Paribas
announcement on 9 August 2007 was such that they immediately with-
drew funding from virtually all borrowing institutions. This reaction
may have seemed irrational but that, on the contrary, it was entirely
understandable becomes clear as soon as the opaque and complex nature
of the structured credit products is taken into consideration.
The cardinal rule of market exchange is that the properties of a product
have to be sufficiently transparent as to allow it to be valued and traded
Table 3 Characteristics of Conduits and SIVs.
Source: IMF (2008) .
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against market standards. Government and corporate securities generally
meet this criterion. So too do asset-backed securities. However, CDOs do
not. They may only be ‘second floor securities’, but the jump in complexity
going from ABS to CDOs is many times greater than the jump going from
the ‘ground floor’ government and corporate debt securities to the ‘first
floor’ asset backed securities. The reason has not only to do with the credit
enhancement techniques used to construct CDOs. It also has to do with the
heterogeneity of the asset classes used in their construction. Asset-backed
securities have a transparent conformity in that each type has a single asset
class as collateral (residential mortgage loans, credit card loans, commercial
property loans, and so on). By contrast, no two individual CDOs were alike
because of the large variety of ways in which different asset classes (sub-
prime backed securities, other nonconforming loan backed securities, prime
ABS, and so on) could be mixed together as the backing collateral. CDOs
could still be sold, but only as unique, customised products tailored to suit
the specific needs of specific investors. Ultimately, it was because the CDO
market constituted a fragmented, relation-based domain rather than an inte-
grated market domain as normally exists that explains why lending institu-
tions in the moneymarkets did not knowwhowas exposed to CDOs and to
what extent and why they decided to play safe and withdraw funding from
virtually all borrowing institutions.
When the money markets froze up on the day of the BNP Paribas
announcement (see Brunnermeier’s, 2009, event logbook), it was through
the consequent withdrawal of liquidity from the conduits rather than
from the SIVs that a crisis of confidence erupted in the inter-bank market.
This was not only due to the differences in the size of assets held by these
respective entities. Just as important were the differences in ownership
and sponsorship structure. While some SIVs were sponsored by commer-
cial banks, others were sponsored by investment banks, while yet others
had multiple sponsors. This dispersion of sponsorship structure in the
case of the SIVs helps to explain why it was that when they became
Table 4 Ten largest conduits and sponsors (end-2006).
Source: Acharya et al. (2010).
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insolvent the negative effects were not concentrated on any one particu-
lar group of parent financial institutions. By contrast, the commercial
banks took a huge hit following the financial collapse of the conduits
because they owned or sponsored the great majority of them (270 out of
the 300 or so operating in 2007).
When the short-term funding for these vehicles suddenly dried up, the
assets held by them that had to be brought back onto the parent banks’
balance sheets were of sufficient volume as to cause the trust between the
banks to break down completely. The crux of the matter is that while the
commercial banks had given a 100% guarantee to their conduits (a fact
that explained their high credit ratings and consequent ability to issue
ABCP at very advantageous rates) they had made no corresponding capi-
tal provision for the conduits’ extensive $1 trillion plus assets. This meant
that the banks, already heavily reliant on short-term funding to help close
the gap in the liability side of their balance sheets caused by the trend fall
in household deposits, had to increase that reliance even further. Know-
ing that these short-term funding problems were common to all of them,
the banks became extremely reluctant to lend to each other with the
result that the liquidity-solvency crisis already under way threatened to
spiral out of control. Indeed, had the major central banks not immedi-
ately pumped massive amounts of liquidity into the money markets in
the summer of 2007 and beyond there is no doubt that the entire global
financial system would have collapsed.
The conclusion that comes out of the above argument is that the
‘endogenous’ explanation of shadow banking growth and its consequen-
ces has plausibility in accounting for the damage done to the regular
banking sector caused by the collapse of its off-balance-sheet conduits.
While regulatory arbitrage and financial innovation were important
enabling factors in the growth of the SPEs and SIVs and of their activities,
with the principal driving force in this growth being investors’ search for
yield, the reverse was the case regarding the growth of the conduits and
their activities. Certainly, there was strong demand for the ABCP issued
by the conduits, but the major motivation behind the growth of these
investment vehicles operated by the commercial banks was to take full
advantage of financial innovation and lax regulation of off-balance-sheet
entities and activities so as to maximise bank profits. As Acharya and
Schnabl (2009) document, US and other advanced economy banks gained
handsomely from exploiting regulatory arbitrage to establish conduits
that issued ABCP sought by money market funds around the world.
5. SOME LESSONS
Nothing that has been said above should be interpreted to mean that we
do not support tight regulation of the shadow banking system. On the
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contrary, we fully endorse the moves in this direction. Rather, our ulti-
mate aim in looking at the shadow banking system from a disaggregated
perspective is to show that regulation of this system will not on its own
suffice to prevent a future financial crisis. Indeed, we go so far as to con-
jecture that if tight regulation of the shadow banking system is not
accompanied by certain wider initiatives that target the activities of other
important financial players, then it is possible that this particular policy
will make a future financial crisis more, not less, likely.
The thinking behind this conjecture centres on the continuing struc-
tural imbalance between the global supply of debt securities and the
global demand for them and the consequent resurgent problem of yield.
At the time of writing, it seems that regulating either the production of
CDOs or the SIVs responsible for their production will have little rele-
vance as both these financial instruments and financial institutions have
been hit hard by the crisis. The long-term securities that will in the main
be affected by current regulation insofar as they do continue to be created
and distributed on a large-scale are of the ABS type. The problem here is
that if the subjection of the bank-owned or sponsored SPEs – the major
entities behind ABS production – to tight regulation results in a slowing
down in the rate of that production, this could have potentially negative
consequences because this slow down would come on top of the already
existing constraints on the rate of growth of private sector securities.2
The fact is that the detrimental effect on security supplies caused by the
fall-out of the financial crisis has not been accompanied by a correspond-
ing effect on the global demand for debt securities exercised by institu-
tional asset managers and other investor groups. On the contrary, global
demand for investable assets has continued to rise and while the expan-
sion in government debt securities has gone some way to meet this
increase in demand it has not gone far enough. The result is that the
‘search for yield’ phenomenon has again reared its head, as attested by
the fact that investments in hedge funds and other speculative vehicles
are again reaching record levels.
In sum, our argument is that regulation of the shadow banking sector,
insofar as this affects ABS issuance, must be accompanied by other initia-
tives aimed at resolving the bond market supply and demand imbalance
and thus eliminating the risk of a return of financial products and pro-
cesses of the type that caused the last financial crisis. On the supply side
of the equation, the governments of the leading advance market econo-
mies should be encouraged to continue with bond-financed expansion-
ary fiscal policies. Given that investors in this post-crisis era continue to
need more supplies of ‘safe haven’ stores of value (as evidenced by the
low yields on US, UK, German and other core economy government
bonds that persist even while government debt to GDP ratios remain at
unusually high levels in these countries) one could expect these
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governments to continue a programme of debt-financed fiscal expansion
for as long as the post-crisis global economy remains in a depressed state.
On the demand side of the equation, a possible policy initiative is to tar-
get the huge accumulations of wealth concentrated in the hands of the
world’s super rich. Given that well over half of the $45 trillion worth of
assets currently owned by HNWIs are held in equity and debt securities,
it follows that government coordinated taxes on this private wealth
would help to significantly reduce the pressure of demand for yield bear-
ing securities.
6. CONCLUSION
The implications of our analysis for the study of shadow banking and
financial innovation in the crisis are twofold. First, focusing on the role of
the products of unregulated financial innovation, it opens up a ‘stock’
perspective on the shadow banking system, as opposed to more conven-
tional flow accounts perspectives that have characterised much of the
current literature on the phenomenon. Second, our linkage of CDO pro-
duction to the strong demand for safe assets suggests that unlike many
earlier financial crises, the global credit meltdown of 2007–9 was not
caused chiefly by speculation, greed or exuberance. These factors cer-
tainly all played a role, as has been well documented, but they should
not be allowed to detract from the importance of investor pressures on
the shadow banking system to create the toxic securities that caused the
financial system to go into cardiac arrest. This point has important policy
implications. The shadow banking system that was instrumental in the
recent and some argue, ongoing financial crisis, will in many ways cease
to exist following regulations aimed at divesting the system of the very
attributes that caused it to be so named in the first place. While there can
be no doubt that such regulation is very appropriate even though very
belated, there is doubt as to whether it will suffice to prevent a future
financial crisis. This issue will be resolved not only by understanding the
role played by both the regulated and unregulated parts of the banking
system in the last financial crisis but also by understanding the various
external pressures on the banking system to play the role that it did. This
paper has sought to make a contribution to this task.
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NOTES
1. Bakk-Simon et al. (2012), writing under the auspices of the European Central
Bank, follow the FSB’s definition of the shadow banking system.
2. Gorton and Metrick (2010) have proposed that following the ‘run on the repo’,
which in their view caused the financial crisis of 2007–8, there should be
tighter restrictions on the creation and distribution of ABSs, the long-term
securities that provided much of the collateral fodder for the short-term repo
transactions. However, what their proposal ignores is the fact that a good deal
of the ABSs created before the crisis were held by pension funds and other
institutional investors and were not financed by short-term repos. To quote
from Shleifer’s critical comment on the Gorton-Metrick proposal: ‘at least
some, and possibly a good part, of ABSs were acquired by pension funds,
insurance companies, and even government sponsored enterprises. For these
buyers, short term financing was probably much less important. The reason
this observation is of some consequence is that Gorton and Metrick’s regula-
tory proposal would require that ABSs be maturity transformed, which pre-
sumably would prevent their being sold to investors in long-term securities. I
am far from certain that this would be desirable’ (Shleifer, 2010: 300).
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